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Understanding Permutation
Symmetry.
STEVEN FRENCH & DEAN RICKLES
If a system in atomic physics contains a number of parti-
cles of the same kind, e.g. a number of electrons, the particles
are absolutely indistinguishable one from another. No observable
change is made when two of them are interchanged ... A satis-
factory theory ought, of course, to count any two observationally
indistinguishable states as the same state and to deny that any
transition does occur when two similar particles exchange places.
(Dirac 1958, 207.)
1. Introduction.
In our contribution to this volume we deal with discrete symmetries: these
are symmetries based upon groups with a discrete set of elements (gener-
ally a set of elements that can be enumerated by the positive integers). In
physics we find that discrete symmetries frequently arise as ‘internal’, non-
spacetime symmetries. Permutation symmetry is such a discrete symmetry
arising as the mathematical basis underlying the statistical behaviour of en-
sembles of certain types of indistinguishable quantum particle (e.g., fermions
and bosons). Roughly speaking, if such an ensemble is invariant under a per-
mutation of its constituent particles (i.e., permutation symmetric) then one
doesn’t ‘count’ those permutations which merely ‘exchange’ indistinguishable
particles; rather, the exchanged state is identified with the original state.
This principle of invariance is generally called the ‘indistinguishability
postulate’ [IP], but we prefer to use the term ‘permutation invariance’ [PI].
It is this symmetry principle that is typically taken to underpin and explain
the nature of (fermionic and bosonic) quantum statistics (although, as we
shall see, this characterisation is not uncontentious), and it is this principle
that has important consequences regarding the metaphysics of identity and
individuality for particles exhibiting such statistical behaviour.
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In this paper we will largely be dealing with the following two types of
problem:
(1) How are we to understand the metaphysics of PI?
For instance, do we follow the ‘received view’ and say that permutation invari-
ance shows us that quantum particles are not individuals? Do we maintain
that they are individuated by their spatiotemporal location, or perhaps by
some extra-theoretical property (e.g., the ‘primitive thisness’ of the object)?
Given this individuation how are we to understand PI? Maybe we can resolve
the issue in some completely different way, with ‘structures’ replacing ‘ob-
jects’ perhaps? It is clear that such questions readily relate to ‘traditional’
metaphysical issues connected to identity and individuality.
(2) How are we to understand the status of PI, theoretically and
empirically?
For example, should PI be considered as an axiom of quantum mechanics?
Or should it be taken as justified empirically? Why do there appear to be
only bosons and fermions in the world when PI allows the possibility of many
more types? This is usually resolved by postulating, ad hoc, some ‘super-
selection rule’, called the “symmetrisation postulate” [SP], restricting the
state vector to the fermionic and bosonic subspaces of the systems’ Hilbert
space. However, rather than resolving the difficulty, this simply moves the
explanatory task one step backwards (i.e., how are we then to understand
SP?). Alternatively, the extra, possibly redundant, mathematical structure
responsible for the extra possibilities regarding symmetry types of particles
can be understood as ‘surplus structure’ (in the sense of Redhead 1975). One
often finds such surplus structure in theories possessing lots of symmetry, and
it frequently points to the existence of ‘gauge freedom’ in a theory (e.g., in
general relativity, Yang-Mills theory, and electromagnetism). It is here that a
possible relation of permutation invariance to diffeomorphism invariance (the
symmetry underlying the general covariance of general relativity) becomes
apparent.
In this paper we survey a number of these issues and their consequences,
introducing the reader to the various schools of thought regarding the status
and interpretation of PI (and , likewise, though to a lesser extent, SP). Let
us begin with a brief introduction to the formal aspects of PI and relevant
related topics in group theory and classical/quantum statistical mechanics.
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2. The Mathematics & Physics of Permutation Symmetry.
Permutation symmetry is a discrete symmetry supported by the permu-
tation group Perm(X ) of bijective maps (the permutation operators, Pˆ ) of
a set X onto itself.1 When X is of finite dimension Perm(X ) is known as
the symmetric group Sn (where the n refers to the dimension of the group).
For instance, X might be the set consisting of the labels of the two sides of
a coin: heads ‘H’ and tails ‘T’. Or perhaps the ‘names’ of n particles making
up some quantum mechanical system, an He4 atom for example. If we take
the coin as our example, then X = {H, T} and Perm(X ) is an order two
group, S2, consisting of two elements (computed as having 2! elements via
the dimension, n = 2, of the group): (1) the identity map, idX , which maps
H to H and T to T; and (2) the ‘flip’ map (or ‘exchange’ operator), PˆHT ,
which maps H to T and T to H.
Now, to say that some object (i.e. a set or the total state vector of a
system of particles) is ‘permutation symmetric’ means that it is invariant
under the action of Perm(X ): it remains unchanged (in some relevant sense)
when it is operated upon by the elements (i.e., the permutation operators) of
Perm(X ), including (for n ≥ 2) the elements that ‘exchange’ the components
of the object (in this case the labels of the sides of the coin or the labels of
the particles in a quantum system).
The coin clearly is not permutation symmetric (i.e., does not satisfy PI),
since we must distinguish ‘heads’ from ‘tails’; that is, there is an observable
difference between these two states of a coin. However, when we consider
systems containing several indistinguishable particles2, each with several pos-
sible states (particles such as electrons, neutrons, and photons), we find that
they are indeed permutation symmetric, and that this symmetry ‘shrinks’
the number of possible states of the total system, thus altering the statistical
1The fact that the set Perm(X ) has the structure of a group simply means that: (1) we
can combine any two elements (Pˆ1, Pˆ2 ∈ Perm(X )) in the set to produce another element
(Pˆ3 = Pˆ1 · Pˆ2) that is also contained within that set (Pˆ3 ∈ Perm(X )); and (2) each element
Pˆ ∈ Perm(X ) also has an inverse Pˆ−1 ∈ Perm(X ).
2Particles are said to be indistinguishable in that they possess the same state inde-
pendent (intrinsic) properties, such as rest mass, charge, and spin. Since these quantities
have a continuous spectrum in classical mechanics we can still individuate particles by
their variations with respect to these properties. If it were the case that we had a classical
system containing particles that exactly matched in these properties, then we could still
distinguish the subsystems by their spatiotemporal location. Such luxuries are not avail-
able in quantum theory because of discrete spectra and the absence of definite trajectories.
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behaviour of the ensemble. In this way PI is generally taken to explain the
divergence of quantum statistics from classical statistics.3
To see how these ‘altered statistics’ follow from PI, and what they look
like, let us compare classical and (bosonic/fermionic) quantum statistics us-
ing a simple example.
Consider the distribution of a system of n indistinguishable objects (e.g.,
free particles) over m microstates. It is helpful at this stage to view the
objects as balls and the microstates as the two halves of a box (making each
side big enough to accommodate all n balls).4 Statistical mechanics is, very
loosely, the study of the number of ways one can redistribute the objects over
the microstates without altering the macrostate. Let us consider the simple
case where we have two objects (balls) and two microstates (boxes). Let us
label the balls by ‘a’ and ‘b’, and the sides of the box by ‘L’ (left) and ‘R’
(right). Let ‘L(a)’ be the state where ball a is in the left hand side (LHS)
of the box; let ‘L(ab)’ be the state where both balls are in the LHS; and let
‘L(0)’ mean that the LHS is empty (similarly, mutatis mutandis, for the right
hand side (RHS) and ball b). Classically, we have four possible distributions:
L(a) R(b)
L(b) R(a)
L(ab) R(0)
L(0) R(ab)
Each possible permutation of the balls is counted in the statistics and, if we
assume equiprobability, each configuration has a probability of 1/4 of being
realized. Such a distribution is known as a Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution,
and it follows the corresponding statistics for such distributions.5
The situation is different when we consider quantum particles because,
in addition to being indistinguishable, they are subject to PI. There are two
3Note, however, that this explanatory link has been contested by Huggett (1999a).
4The separators in the diagrams are there as an aid to visualization rather than as a
part of the system we are considering.
5Huggett (op. cit.) has argued that Maxwell-Boltzmann statistics do not necessarily
imply that we must must count permutations as distinct: when there are many states
available to each particle the rule breaks down. In the case of the present example we are
dealing with many particles per state, and so the relation between Maxwell-Boltzmann
statistics and counting permutations as distinct still holds.
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types of statistical behaviour for particles in quantum mechanics having to
do with the ways in which they can combine in ensembles.6 Firstly, we have
bosons (particles with integer spins; e.g., photons) behaving according to the
Bose-Einstein statistics: meaning, inter alia, that these particles can occupy
the same state in a quantum system (the balls can reside the same side of
the box). Secondly, we have fermions (particles with half-integer spins; e.g.,
electrons) behaving according to the Fermi-Dirac statistics: meaning, inter
alia, that these particles cannot occupy the same state in a quantum system
(the balls cannot reside in the same side of the box). This latter principle - not
directly connected to PI - is generally known as Pauli’s Exclusion Principle.
These two points have an impact on the possible configurations we can
count in the statistics. For instance, in the case of bosons we identify those
configurations which differ only by an exchange of identical particles (i.e., the
first and second configurations from the classical statistics above), but we can
allow those configurations in which two objects occupy the same state. So if
we consider the balls as bosons we get the following three distinct possibilities
(where ‘L(1)’ means that ‘some’ particle is in the LHS - similarly, mutatis
mutandis for the RHS):
L(1) R(1)
L(ab) R(0)
L(0) R(ab)
So we have removed a classically possible state by identifying ‘exchanged
states’.7 This has the consequence that the probabilities for finding a system
in a certain state (still assuming equiprobability) each go from 1/4 to 1/3.
Following a similar procedure with fermions, and then applying the exclusion
principle, we get just one possible state:
L(1) R(1)
6Of course, we are, for the moment, ignoring the case of para-statistics; namely, types
of quantum statistics that violate SP, on which see §3 and §4.
7Note that we have simplified the first configuration here, since what we actually have,
formally, is the state: [(L(a) & R(b)) + (L(b) & R(a))]. In the fermionic case we find a
similar superposition only with a change in sign (when the permutations are odd): [(L(a)
& R(b)) - (L(b) & R(a))]. Note that the change of sign has no effect on the observable
properties (expectation values) of the system.
5
Which, of course, has a probability of 1 of being realized. All we have done
here is to identify those configurations which differ only in which ball occupies
which side of the box (following Dirac’s intuition expressed in the opening
quote) and then we have forbidden two balls to occupy the same side. In
both the quantum cases the systems (or, more formally, their state vectors)
are invariant under the action of the permutation group: when we apply the
permutation operators to the state vectors they continue to describe the same
physical state; following Dirac’s intuition we identify the states. Hence, the
quantum systems satisfy PI, unlike the classical system. Let us now make
some of these ideas more exact by introducing some elementary quantum
theory.
States of quantum systems (single or many-particle) are represented by
rays Ψ in a Hilbert space H. For many particle systems the Hilbert space is
the joint space constructed by tensoring together the component particles’
Hilbert spaces. The observables Oˆ of a quantum system are represented by
Hermitian operators acting upon that system’s Hilbert space.
Now consider a system consisting of two indistinguishable particles. The
Hilbert space for this system is: Htotal = H1 ⊗H2, where the subscripts ‘1’
and ‘2’ label the composite particles, and H1 = H2 = H. If the particles are
in the pure states φ and ψ respectively, then the composite system is in the
(pure) state Ψ = φ⊗ ψ. The permutation operators act upon Ψ as follows:
(1) Pˆid(Ψ) = (φ⊗ ψ) and (2) Pˆφψ(Ψ) = (ψ ⊗ φ).
The Hamiltonian, HˆΨ = Hˆ(φ⊗ ψ), of the composite system is symmet-
ric with respect to φ and ψ. Hence, HˆΨ is invariant under the action of
the permutation group of permutations of the composite particles’ labels:
[Hˆ, Pˆ ] = 0, ∀Pˆ . By an invariance of a quantum state under the action of
the permutation group (i.e., PI) we then mean that every physical observ-
able Oˆ commutes with every permutation operator Pˆ : [Oˆ, Pˆ ] = 0, ∀Oˆ∀Pˆ -
the physical interpretation of this being that there is no measurement that
we could perform which would result in a discernible difference between per-
muted (final) and unpermuted (initial) states. This has the consequence that
expectation values for unpermuted states are equal to expectation values for
permutations of that state. Or, more formally, for any arbitrary state ψ,
Hermitian operator Oˆ, and permutation operator Pˆ :
〈ψ | Oˆ | ψ〉 = 〈Pˆψ | Oˆ | Pˆψ〉 = 〈ψ | Pˆ−1OˆPˆ | ψ〉 (1)
It is this result - basically a formal expression of PI - which motivates the
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claim that PI can be understood as a restriction on the possible observables
of a system given its state and, as such, it can be viewed as a superselection
rule determining which observables are physically relevant. We shall return
to this claim and, more generally, the status of PI in later sections.
Finally, let us turn to the mathematical representation of particle types.
For this we need the concept of an ‘irreducible representation’. Firstly, a
representation ρ of a group G on a linear space V is simply a map that
assigns to each element of the group g ∈ G a linear operator Oˆ(V ) on the
space. When the linear space is the (joint) Hilbert space H spanned by
the states, {φ ⊗ φ, φ ⊗ ψ, ψ ⊗ φ, ψ ⊗ ψ}, of two indistinguishable particles,
and the group is the permutation group, the representation will associate
a unitary operator acting on H (i.e., on the state vector Ψ ∈ H) to each
permutation operator Pˆ ∈ Perm(X ). We can represent this schematically as
follows (beginning with the group element, then the representation of that
element, and finally the physical operation)8:
(1) PˆφψΨ⇒
(
0 1
1 0
)
Ψ ⇒ ‘exchanging the particles’.
(2) PˆidΨ⇒
(
1 0
0 1
)
Ψ ⇒ ‘leaving them alone’.
This pair of matrices gives a unitary representation of Perm(X ) on H. The
only matrix that commutes with both of them is the unit matrix or some
scalar multiple of the unit matrix. Representations of this kind are said to
be ‘irreducible’. Alternatively, a representation is said to be irreducible if the
only invariant subspaces it possesses are {0} and H (i.e., the zero vector and
the whole space) - where a subspace H′ of H is invariant if Ψ ∈ H′ implies
ρ(Pˆ )Ψ ∈ H′, ∀Pˆ .
We are interested in the irreducible representations of the permutation
group because each such representation is ‘carried’ by an irreducible subspace
of the Hilbert space, where each such subspace is invariant under the action
of the permutation operators. Thus, the subspaces represent symmetry sec-
tors corresponding to the possible types of permutation symmetry possessed
8We should point out that this way of doing things is an oversimplification in the
following respects: firstly, since the joint states lie in a four dimensional Hilbert space
they are represented by 4-vectors, but here we are assuming that they are 2-vectors. Also,
the permutation operators should properly be 4× 4 matrices, here we write them as 2× 2
matrices. However, since nothing of import depends on this, we prefer to keep things
simple in this way to facilitate understanding.
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by the particles whose state vectors lie in that subspace. In the case we
are considering we find that the total Hilbert space is partitioned into two
subspaces invariant under the permutation group: (1) a (three-dimensional)
symmetric subspace (spanned by three vectors: {φ⊗φ, ψ⊗φ, φ⊗φ+ψ⊗φ})
corresponding to bosons; and (2) a (one-dimensional) anti-symmetric sub-
space (spanned by one vector: {φ⊗ φ−ψ⊗ φ}) corresponding to fermions.9
The symmetric subspace is quite clearly reducible, but the three subspaces
spanning it are one-dimensional and, therefore, irreducible: they contain no
permutation invariant proper subspaces. Hence, the irreducible representa-
tions correspond to types of particle.10
However, when we consider more than two particles (giving a non-abelian
permutation group) we find that we get more than the two symmetry types
that we observe in nature. For instance, for three indistinguishable parti-
cles we have 3! irreducible representations of the permutation group in the
joint Hilbert space. In addition to the standard symmetry types (bosons and
fermions), we also obtain ‘parabosons’ and ‘parafermions’, transforming dif-
ferently under the action of the permutation group, and leading to alternative
kinds of statistical behaviour known as ‘parastatistics’.11
Thus, with the framework we have built up so far we can see that there is
more ‘mathematical structure’ than there is ‘physical structure’: nature has
shown us (so far) that there are bosons and fermions, whilst the theory allows
for particles with different symmetry types (with potentially observable dif-
ferences). In order to overcome this problem Messiah (1962, 595) introduced
a postulate, the “symmetrisation postulate” [SP], which served to restrict the
possible particles to those two classes that we have so far found the world
to be grouped into. This postulate can be stated simply: States of identi-
cal particle systems must be either symmetrical or anti-symmetrical under
the action of permutation operators. We can now turn to the philosophical
implications of these ideas.
9These ‘spanning’ vectors correspond, of course, to the possible outcomes in the quan-
tum statistics.
10The symmetry properties mentioned earlier mean also that symmetry type is con-
served; that is, state vectors remain in one or the other subspace over time: once a boson
(fermion) always a boson (fermion)! However, this rule breaks down in supersymmetric
theories, since such theories possess a symmetry relating Fermi (matter) to Bose (force);
however, we shall ignore this complication here.
11The statistical behaviour of these ‘higher-dimensional’ irreducible representations is
best modelled by the ‘braid group’ rather than the ‘permutation group’.
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3. The Relationship Between Permutation Invariance and the
Symmetrisation Postulate
Let us consider in a little more detail the relationship between SP and
PI. The former is obviously a restriction on the states of the assembly. If the
latter is likewise understood, then it is easy to see that SP is sufficient but
not necessary for PI. Understood in this way, the fact that PI is implied by
SP means it picks up indirect empirical support from the latter (assuming
that all known particles are either bosons or fermions - an assumption which
has been questioned (see the papers in Hilborn and Tino 2000)).
However, as Greenberg and Messiah argued, PI should be interpreted,
not as a restriction on the states, but rather as a restriction on the possible
observables for the assembly (Greenberg and Messiah 1964). On this view, PI
dictates that any permitted observable must commute with any permutation
operator and this in turn implies that the observable must be a symmetric
function of the particle labels. The difference between SP and PI can thus
be expressed as follows: SP expresses a restriction on the states for all ob-
servables, Q; whereas PI expresses a restriction on the observables, Q, for all
states. From this perspective what PI does is restrict the accessibility of cer-
tain states, such that once in a certain set of states, whether Bose-Einstein,
Fermi-Dirac or parastatistical of a given order, the particles cannot move into
a different set. However, the question as to its status now becomes acute.
Before we discuss this question in more detail, we shall consider one further
aspect of the formal representation of quantum statistics and PI.
4. Permutation Invariance and the Topological Approach to
Particle Identity.
As is well known, Schro¨dinger’s early attempt to give a broadly classical
interpretation of the new quantum mechanics foundered on the point that
the appropriate space for a many-particle wave function had to be multi-
dimensional. Even then, as Einstein pointed out, use of the full configuration
space formed by the N-fold Cartesian product of three-dimensional Euclidean
space appeared to conflict with the new quantum statistics insofar as within
this full space, configurations related by a particle permutation are regarded
as distinct. The standard resolution of this problem, of course, is to move to
the reduced quotient space formed by the action of the permutation group on
the full configuration space, in which points corresponding to a permutation
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of the particles are identified, and then apply appropriate quantum conditions
(see Leinaas and Myrheim 1977). In this context PI is effectively coded into
the topology of configuration space itself, and the different statistical types
then correspond to different choices of boundary conditions on the wave
function ( see, for example, Bourdeau and Sorkin 1992).
This reduced configuration space is not in general a smooth manifold since
it possesses singular points where two or more particles coincide. This leads
to two technical difficulties: first, it is not clear how one might define the rele-
vant Hamiltonian at such singularities (ibid., 687) and secondly, the existence
of these singular points is not compatible with Fermi-Dirac statistics. The
obvious, and now standard, solution is to simply remove from the configura-
tion space the subcomplex consisting of all such coincidence points, yielding
a smooth manifold. The relevant group for n particles is then the n-string
braid group as we noted above, and the irreducible unitary representations
of this group can be used to label the different statistics that are possible.
Imbo, Shah Imbo and Sudarshan have provided a definition of the ‘statistical
equivalence’ of two such representations in terms of which they obtain not
merely ordinary statistics, parastatistics and fractional or anyon statistics
but more exotic forms which they call ‘ambistatistics’ and ‘fractional ambis-
tatistics’ (Imbo, Shah Imbo and Sudarshan 1990). The deployment of the
braid group in this manner may appear to conflict with the suggestion that
one of the advantages of the configuration space approach is that it actually
excludes the possibility of non-standard statistics. This claim is based on
the work of Leinaas and Myrheim (op. cit.) which apparently demonstrates
that for a space of dimension 3 or greater only the standard statistics are
possible. The conclusion drawn is that “... the (anti-) symmetrisation condi-
tion on the wave function is now seen to be related to the dimensionality of
space, in contrast to the Messiah and Greenberg analysis wherein the (anti-)
symmetrisation condition receives the status of a postulate” (Brown et al.
1992, 230).
It turns out, however, that this treatment assumes the standard quan-
tisation procedure which incorporates one-dimensional Hilbert spaces only.
From the group-theoretical perspective this amounts to allowing only one-
dimensional representations and so it should come as no surprise that para-
and ambi-statistics cannot arise. Effectively what Leinaas and Myrhiem have
done is to ignore the ‘kinematical ambiguity’ inherent in the quantisation pro-
cedure which derives from the (mathematical) fact that the set of irreducible
representations of the permutation group contains not just the trivial repre-
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sentation manifested above but also others corresponding to exotic statistics
(Imbo et al. 1990, 103-104). In what follows we shall occasionally return to
the topological approach to see if it can shed any light on the issue of the
status of PI.
5. Permutation Invariance and the Metaphysics of Individuality.
5.1 The Received View: Quantum Particles as Non-Individuals.
One well known approach to this issue takes PI to be profoundly related
to the peculiar metaphysical character of quantum particles, namely that
they are ‘identical’ or ‘non-individual’, in some sense. Referring back to
our illustration of the difference between classical and quantum statistics
above, the argument for such a view goes like this: in classical Maxwell-
Boltzmann statistics, a permutation of the particles is taken to give rise to a
new, countable arrangement. Since the particles are indistinguishable, in the
sense of possessing all intrinsic or state-independent properties in common
(that is, properties such as rest mass, charge, spin, etc.), this generation
of new arrangements must reflect something about the particles which goes
beyond their intrinsic properties, something which allows us to treat them
as distinct individuals. In the quantum case - whether Fermi-Dirac or Bose-
Einstein - the distribution is permutation invariant and a permutation of
the particles does not yield a new arrangement. Hence the statistical weight
in quantum statistics - of either form - is appropriately reduced. Since the
particles are regarded as indistinguishable in the same sense as their classical
counterparts, this reduction in the count, due to PI, must reflect the fact
that the particles can no longer be regarded as individuals - they are, in
some sense, ‘non-individuals’. In other words, according to this argument,
PI implies non-individuality.
We shall call this view - that quantum particles are, in some sense, not
individuals the Received View. It became fixed in place almost immediately
after the development of quantum statistics itself (and in its modern incar-
nation it can be found in Dieks 1990, for example). Thus at the famous
Solvay Conference of 1927, Langevin noted that quantum particles could ap-
parently no longer be identified as individuals and that same year, both Born
and Heisenberg insisted that quantum statistics implied that the “individu-
ality of the corpuscle is lost” (Born 1926; see Miller 1987, 310). Some years
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later, in 1936, Pauli wrote to Heisenberg that he considered this loss of indi-
viduality to be “... something much more fundamental than the space-time
concept” (see von Meyenn 1987, 339).
5.2 Challenges to the Received View.
The Received View has been challenged on a variety of grounds over the
past fifteen years or so. These challenges come at the issue from two di-
rections, and in both cases it is denied that there exists some fundamental
metaphysical difference between quantum and classical particles. The first
challenge insists that classical particles, like their quantum counterparts, are
not only ‘indistinguishable’, in the above sense, but should also be under-
stood as subject to PI. The grounds for this claim rest on a positivistic
understanding of the meaning of ‘non-individuality’ which takes the latter
notion to be determined experimentally (Hestenes 1970). The idea is that
non-individuality follows from the requirement that in order for the entropy
be extensive, the relevant expression must be divided by N!, where N is
the number of particles in the assembly. It is this extensivity of entropy
which, it is claimed, resolves the infamous Gibbs’ paradox: if like gases at
the same pressure and temperature are mixed, then there is no change in
the experimental entropy. This is in disagreement with the result obtained
from Maxwell-Boltzmann statistics, incorporating the considerations of par-
ticle permutations sketched above. Excluding such permutations from the
calculation of the statistical entropy by dividing by N! is then understood as
resolving the ‘paradox’. If this were correct, then it is claimed - classical sta-
tistical mechanics would have to be regarded as permutation invariant also
(see, for example, Saunders forthcoming, 22, fn. 13) and the contrast with
quantum physics would have to be sought elsewhere.
Historically, however, the failure of extensivity and the Gibbs Paradox
were seen as revealing a fundamental flaw in the Maxwell-Boltzmann defini-
tion of entropy and one which is corrected by shifting to an understanding
of the particles as quantum in nature.12 In other words, the force of the
argument can be turned around: what it shows is that the world is actu-
ally quantum in nature, as one would expect. What the exclusion of the
12Here we are following Post who writes, “... the flaw in classical statistical mechanics
represented by Gibbs’ paradox points to a radical theory of non-individuality such as
Bose’s” (1971, 23, fn. 50). By ‘flaw’ here Post means a ‘neuralgic point’ which can act as
the heuristic stimulus for new theoretical development.
12
permutations (by dividing by N!) is a manifestation of is precisely that the
particles are not just indistinguishable in the classical sense. If this aspect
is incorporated into the analysis from the word go, the so-called ‘paradox’
simply does not arise13.
The second challenge suggests that, contrary to the Received View quan-
tum particles, just like their classical counterparts, can also be regarded as in-
dividuals. The question immediately arises: if this were the case, how would
one account for the different treatment of permutations; that is, how would
one account for the difference between classical and quantum statistics? We
recall that this difference lies in the drop in statistical weight assigned to the
relevant arrangements. This can be accounted for, without appealing to the
supposed ‘non-individuality’ of the particles, by focussing explicitly on the
role of PI, understood as a kind of initial ‘accessibility’ condition (French
1989a).
To see this, let us recall that, understood as a restriction on the ob-
servables, PI acts as a super-selection rule which divides up the relevant
Hilbert space into a number of irreducible sub-spaces, corresponding to ir-
reducible representations of the symmetric group. It can be shown that
transitions between such subspaces are (generally) forbidden (at least in non-
supersymmetric theories). Hence PI imposes a restriction on the states of
the assembly such that once a particle is in a given subspace, the other -
corresponding to other symmetry types - are inaccessible to it. Returning to
the argument above, the reduction in statistical weight is now explained by
the inaccessibility of certain states, rather than by a change in the metaphys-
ical nature of the particles. In the simple case of two particles distributed
over two one-particle states, the only subspaces available are the symmetric
and antisymmetric and so only one of the two possible states formed by a
permutation is ever available to the system. Thus the statistical weight cor-
responding to the distribution of one particle in each such state is half the
classical value.
We shall examine the two components of this alternative to the Received
View in a little more detail. First of all, with regard to the role of PI,
the idea of restrictions on the set of states accessible to a system can also
be found in classical statistical mechanics, of course. There it is the energy
13Historically, the N! division was the subject of a vigorous dispute between Planck,
who defended the move, and Ehrenfest, who argued that it was ad hoc as it stood and
hence required further justification.
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integral which imposes the most important restriction as it determines which
regions of the relevant phase space are accessible. Other uniform integrals
of the motion may also exist for a particular assembly but these are not
generally thermodynamically significant. What PI represents is an additional
constraint or initial condition, imposed on the situation. In particular, the
symmetry type of any suitably specified set of states is an absolute constant
of motion equivalent to an exact uniform integral in classical terms (see Dirac
op. cit., 213-216). Of course, some may wonder whether this actually sheds
much light on the status of PI, since it appears to leave it standing as a kind
of ‘brute fact’ but at least it is no more brutish than the other, classical,
constraints.
Secondly, there is the issue of how we are to understand the individuality
of the particles. As is well known, we have a range of options to choose from,
some more attractive than the others:
(1) Haecceity or primitive thisness (Adams 1979).
(2) Some form of Lockean substance.
(3) Spatiotemporal location.
(4) Some subset of properties.
The first two are perhaps the least attractive as far as broadly ‘empiricist’
philosophers are concerned, since they appeal to factors which are utterly
empirically superfluous (see French and Redhead 1988; Redhead and Teller
1991 and 1992; van Fraassen 1991). However, they share what some would
see as the advantage of making manifest the conceptual distinction between
individuality and distinguishability, where the latter is to be understood
in terms of some difference in properties. The third and fourth collapse
this distinction by taking that which renders the entity distinguishable as
that which also ‘confers’ individuality. Each requires some extra postulate,
however, in order to effect this collapse. In the case of option (3), this extra
‘something’ is the postulate that the particles are impenetrable, since if they
were not, their spatiotemporal locations could not serve to distinguish and
hence individuate them. As is well known, however, this option is problematic
in the quantum context, as standardly understood, since it can be shown that
the family of observables corresponding to the positions of single particles
cannot provide distinguishing spatiotemporal trajectories (as Huggett and
Imbo 2000 emphasise, one can prove the more general result that no family
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of observables can provide such trajectories)14.
Nevertheless, considerations of impenetrability do feature within the topo-
logical approach. We recall that, according to this perspective, we must move
to the reduced configuration space formed by removing the points where the
particles would coincide. An obvious justification for this adverts to the
impenetrability of the particles, understood, in turn, as due to certain re-
pulsive forces holding between them. Such a conjecture has been made in
the case of anyons (see Aitchison and Mavromatos 1991) and more generally
this has been taken to confer a further advantage on the configuration space
approach, in the sense that
... it allows particle statistics to be understood as a kind of
‘force’ in essence similar to other interactions with a topological
character, like the interaction between an electric and magnetic
charge in three spatial dimensions, or the type of interaction in
two dimensions which is responsible for the Bohm-Aharonov ef-
fect and fractional statistics. (Bourdeau and Sorkin op. cit.,
687).15
Some have regarded such an understanding as suspiciously ad hoc (see
Brown et al., op. cit.). One way of eliminating this ‘ad hocness’ is to shift
to the framework of de Broglie-Bohm pilot wave theory16. Here, as is well
known, there is a dual ontology of point particles plus pilot wave, where the
14They also stress that this lack of trajectories does not imply anything about the status
of PI.
15Again, we can’t help but recall some relevant history here. The suggestion that the
non-classical aspects of quantum statistics reflects a lack of statistical independence and
hence a kind of correlation between the particles can be traced as far back as Ehrenfest’s
early reflections on Planck’s work and crops up again and again in the literature. On
the philosophical side, Reichenbach (1956, 234-235) argued that such correlations - taken
realistically in this sense - represent causal anomalies in the behaviour of the particles:
for bosons these anomalies consist in a mutual dependence in the motions of the particles
which could be characterised as a form of action-at-a-distance; for fermions, the anomaly
is expressed in the Exclusion Principle if this is interpreted in terms of an interparticle
force. As far as Reichenbach himself was concerned, such acausal interactions should be
rejected and thus he preferred the account of quantum statistics which emphasises the
metaphysical lack of individuality of the particles and in which the correlations are not
regarded in force-like terms.
16Of course, adopting such a framework means abandoning the standard eigenvalue-
eigenstate link and the latter is precisely what is assumed in the above proofs that spa-
tiotemporal trajectories cannot serve to distinguish.
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role of the latter is to determine the instantaneous velocities of the former
through the so-called ‘guidance equations’ (ibid.). Since these equations are
first-order, the trajectories of two particles which are non-coincident to begin
with will never coincide. In effect the impenetrability of the particles is built
into the guidance equations and the singularity points remain inaccessible.
Hence the conclusion that “... within the topological approach to identical
particles the removal of the set ... of coincidence points from the reduced
configuration space ... follows naturally from de Broglie-Bohm dynamics as
it is defined in the full space ...” (ibid., 233)17.
It is part of the attraction of this framework that it retains, or appears to
retain, a form of classical ontology which meshes well with the metaphysical
view of particles as individuals18. However, it is also important to recognise
that the topological approach can also accommodate the Received View of
particles as non-individuals. Indeed, one of the motivations given by Leinaas
and Myrheim is that it allows one to dispense with the whole business of
introducing particle labels and then effectively emasculating their ontologi-
cal force by imposing appropriate symmetry constraints (op. cit., 2; cf. also
Bourdeau and Sorkin op. cit., 687). Of course, if one is going to insist that
the particles are non-individuals, then some alternative justification for the
removal of the coincidence points must be sought for. One possibility is to
tackle the problem of collisions directly. Bourdeau and Sorkin, for example
(op. cit.), show that for fermions, the self-adjoint extension of the Hamilto-
nian to cover the singularities is unique, at least in the two-dimensional case,
so that collisions are strictly forbidden, whereas in the case of both Bose-
Einstein and fractional statistics there are a range of alternative extensions,
some of which allow collisions but some which do not19. By requiring that
the wave-function remains finite at the coincident point they argue that a
17There is the worry that this might exclude the possibility of Bose-Einstein statistics, if
it is the case that the de Broglie-Bohm trajectories never in fact cross. Brown et. al. argue
that this latter claim is simply not correct since symmetry considerations demonstrate that
if the particles coincide at all, they coincide forever. If the bosons are initially separated,
then the relative velocity vanishes at the coincident point which together with the first
order nature of the guidance equations means that they can never cross (op. cit., 233).
18Brown et. al. explicitly note this point. Nevertheless it is not clear that the particles
can in fact be regarded straightforwardly as individuals in the classical sense (see French
2000). Further criticisms of the view that de Broglie-Bohm theory is philosophically
classical can be found in Bedard 1999. For a response see Dickson 2000.
19Thus they argue that simply cutting out the singular points results in a loss of infor-
mation.
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unique choice of Hamiltonian can then be made and it turns out that colli-
sions are allowed only in the case of Bose-Einstein statistics. Thus, whereas
for fermions it doesn’t really matter whether the singular points are retained
or not, for bosons and anyons, on this account, it does, since these points
are either the locations of collisions in the boson case or the locations of
vanishing Ψ for anyons.
6. Individuality and the Identity of Indiscernibles.
Let us return to our list of options for understanding quantum individu-
ality. Option (4) attempts to ground it in some subset of properties of the
particles. This also requires a supplementary principle in order to block the
possibility of two individuals sharing the same subset of properties, and this
is provided, of course, by the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles (PII). In
terms of second-order logic with equality, PII can be written as
∀Γ{Γ(a) ≡ Γ(b)} → a = b (2)
where ‘a’ and ‘b’ are individual constants designating the entities concerned
and Γ is a variable ranging over the possible attributes of these entities.
Different forms of PII then arise depending on what sort of attributes feature
in the range of Γ20. The logically weakest form, PII(1), states that it is
not possible for two individuals to possess all properties and relations in
common; PII(2) excludes properties and relations which can be described
as spatiotemporal; while the strongest form PII(3), includes only monadic,
non-relational properties. Before we consider the status of these forms of PII
in quantum physics, it is worth noting, first of all, that PII(1) has often been
taken as necessarily true on the grounds that no two individuals can possess
exactly the same spatiotemporal properties or enter into exactly the same
spatiotemporal relations (see, for example, Quinton 1973, 25). This obviously
assumes that the individuals concerned are impenetrable and amounts to a
form of option (3) above. Both PII(1) and PII(2) allow for the possibility
that relations might be capable of distinguishing entities and hence confer
individuality (see for example Casullo 1984, who argues that the view of
entities as nothing more than bundles of properties and relations is only
20We exclude the attribute of ‘being identical with a’, since PII would then simply be
a theorem of second-order logic. Furthermore, Adams identifies haecceity or ‘primitive
thisness’ with precisely this attribute (op. cit.) and hence admitting it here would be
tantamount to adopting option (1).
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plausible if based on PII(1) with relations given the capacity to individuate).
However, such a possibility has been vigorously disputed on the grounds that
since relations presuppose numerical diversity, they cannot account for it (see
Russell 1956 and Armstrong 1978, 94-95). We shall return to this possibility
shortly.
When it comes to the status of PII in quantum physics, if the non-
intrinsic, state-dependent properties are identified with all the monadic or
relational properties which can be expressed in terms of physical magnitudes
associated with self-adjoint operators that can be defined for the particles,
then it can be shown that two bosons or two fermions in a joint symmetric
or anti-symmetric state respectively have the same monadic properties and
the same relational properties one to another (French and Redhead 1988; see
also Butterfield 1993). On the basis of such an identification, even the weak-
est form of the Principle, PII(1), fails for both bosons and fermions (French
and Redhead op. cit.; French 1989b).21 Hence the Principle of Identity of
Indiscernibles cannot be used to effectively guarantee individuation via the
state-dependent properties and option (4) fails.22, leaving Lockean substance
or primitive thisness as the only alternatives
However, there may still be hope for this option. Saunders (ibid., 10-
11) has recently revived Quine’s proposal for the analysis of identity, which
he understands as yielding a version of PII. Roughly speaking this is the
condition that x = y (where x, y, u1, u2, ... are variables) if and only if, for
all unary predicates A, binary predicates B, ..., n-ary predicates P , we have
• A(x) ≡ A(y)
• B(x, u1) ≡ B(y, u1);B(u1, x) ≡ B(u1, y)
• P (x, u1, ..., uni1) ≡ B(y, u1, ..., uni1) and permutations
together with all universal quantifications over the free variables u1, ..., uni1
other than x and y (ibid., 11). If the relevant language contains monadic
21Margenau had earlier concluded that PII(3) fails, since the same reduced state can
be assigned to the fermions in an antisymmetric state and hence they possess the same
monadic properties (Margenau 1944). This conclusion has been criticised on the grounds
that such reduced states cannot be regarded either as ontologically separate or as encoding
genuinely monadic properties (see Mittelstaedt and Castellani 2000; Massimi 2001).
22For alternative discussions see Cortes 1976; Barnette 1978; Ginsberg 1981; Teller 1983;
and van Fraassen 1985 and 1991.
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predicates only, then this principle amounts to the claim that two entities
are identical if and only if they have all properties in common. Two en-
tities are said to be absolutely discernible if there is a formula with only
one free variable which applies to one entity but not the other. With only
monadic predicates allowed, the principle states that numerically distinct en-
tities are absolutely discernible. If relations are admitted, however, one can
have entities which are not identified by the principle yet are not absolutely
discernible. Two entities are said to be relatively discernible if there is a
formula in two free variables which applies to them in any order. But there
is a further category: If the admitted relations include some which are ir-
reflexive, then one can have entities which are counted as distinct according
to the principle but are not even relatively discernible. These are said to
be weakly discernible, and the principle excludes the possibility of entities
neither absolutely, relatively, or weakly discernible.
This, it is claimed, is more natural from a logical point of view (being
immune to the standard counter examples - such as the infamous two globes
- which beset PII; see Saunders (ibid., 7), and is also better suited to quan-
tum mechanics in that, unlike traditional versions of PII, it is not violated
by fermions at least, since an irreflexive relation always exists between them.
Consider for example, two fermions in a spherically-symmetric singlet state.
The fermions are not only indistinguishable but also have exactly the same
spatiotemporal properties and relations in themselves and everything else.
However, each satisfies the symmetric but irreflexive relation of having op-
posite direction of spin to and so are weakly discernible. Thus for fermions,
at least, we have the possibility of grounding their individuality via a ver-
sion of PII, without having to appeal to anything like primitive thisness.23
However, there is an obvious concern one might have here, which reprises
the worry hinted at above, regarding the individuating power of relations:
doesn’t the appeal to irreflexive relations in order to ground the individuality
of the objects which bear such relations involve a circularity? Such concerns
are rooted in the - apparently plausible - view that relata have ontologically
priority over relations, such that the former can be said to ‘bear’ the lat-
ter. Suppose we were to drop such a view. Of course, in order to describe
23No such possibility exists for bosons; however, Saunders adopts the Redhead and
Teller option of regarding them as non-individual field quanta. He takes this metaphysical
difference as tracking the physical one between the ‘stable constituents of ordinary matter’
(fermions) and gauge quanta (bosons), although it is not clear why the metaphysics should
follow the physics in this particular way, or at all.
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the relation - either informally as above or set-theoretically in terms of an
ordered tuple 〈x, y〉 - we have to introduce some form of label, as in the ex-
ample above, but description should not dictate conceptualisation. The label
can be understood as a kind of place-holder and instead of talking of relata
‘bearing’ relations, one can talk of the intersection of relations as constituting
relata, as Cassirer did, or of relata as unifying relations, as Eddington did.
The names here give the game away - what this amounts to is some kind of
structuralist ontology which allows for individuation via relations.
7. PI is Neither Sufficient nor Necessary for Non-Individuality.
Returning now to the issue of the status of PI, the point we want to
emphasise is that something further needs to be added to get from it to
the Received View of particles as non-individuals. In other words, PI is not
sufficient for non-individuality. The question remains, is it necessary?
van Fraassen, for example, has answered that it is not (1991, 375), while
acknowledging that the claim - that “when identity is properly understood, it
entails Permutation Invariance tautologically” (ibid.) - nevertheless contains
a ‘core’ of truth. Butterfield has disagreed, however, insisting that this claim
merely summarises the motivation for PI, namely that expectation values for
the composite system cannot be sensitive to the differences between φ and
Pφ (1993, 457). At issue here, of course, is what is meant by ‘identity’, or
non-individuality, being ‘properly understood’. Butterfield’s understanding
appears to correspond to Dirac’s above, but if one were to reject this as
broadly positivistic, how do the alternatives stand up?
In order to examine this question, we need to consider what we mean
by non-individuality in this context. All of the options considered here are
constructed through a combination of indistinguishability - of course - to-
gether with the denial of some ‘principle’ of individuality, whether that be
substance, primitive thisness, spatiotemporal trajectories, or PII. The ques-
tion then is whether any of these alternatives can provide the restriction on
observables that PI demands. Clearly neither substance nor primitive this-
ness can, since by their very nature, neither can be expressed in terms of
observables! What about indistinguishability plus the denial of spatiotem-
poral trajectories? Huggett and Imbo (2000) have recently considered this
case and have argued that here too PI does not follow. Their argument con-
siders each conjunct separately: first of all, the absence of spatiotemporal
trajectories follows from the dynamics of QM together with the general way
20
observables are treated and again this imposes no restrictions on these ob-
servables. Hence, the lack of spatiotemporal trajectories is simply irrelevant
in this case. Furthermore, there exists the possibility of particles, such as
first quantised versions of Greenberg’s quons (Greenberg 1991)24 which are
indistinguishable but for which every Hermitian operator is an observable -
hence some of the observables are non-symmetric and PI is violated.
Of course, if PII were to hold for quons, then the implication would be
restored for that particular understanding of non-individuality; that is, if
quons could not be considered as non-individuals in this sense, then the vio-
lation of PI would not be indicative of the failure of the entailment. However,
what would have to be shown is that there are no possible quon states for
which PII is violated in the same ways as for bosons and fermions. In the
case of paraparticles, French and Redhead 1988 showed that although there
do exist states for which the monadic properties of all the separate particles
are the same, there also exist possible paraparticle states for which PII is
violated. So far as we know, nothing equivalent has been demonstrated for
quons, although in what little philosophical discussion there has been about
them, it appears to be assumed that such PII violating states exist (Hilborn
and Yuca forthcoming).
The choice, then, is stark: either adopt the Dirac/Butterfield understand-
ing of non-individuality, in which case PI is indeed an expression of it but
not in a metaphysically interesting way, or accept that non-individuality does
not imply permutation invariance. The latter option leaves PI metaphysically
ungrounded.
8. Underdetermination and the Structuralist View of Particles
This metaphysical ‘detachment’ of PI has been expressed in terms of a
kind of underdetermination which holds between the Received View, in which
PI is tied up with the non-individuality of the particles and the alternative
account of particles as individuals, with PI taken as some sort of initial
condition (French and Redhead op. cit.). As we have indicated, PI does not
discriminate between these conceptual possibilities (French 1989a; 1998; van
Fraassen 1991; Huggett 1995; Balousek 2000) and hence any argument for one
24This possibility is not unproblematic, of course. The q-mutator formalism apparently
requires some observables to be non-local and there is the further issue as to whether this
possibility is ruled out on experimental grounds (again see the papers in Hilborn and Tino
2000).
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or the other is going to have to proceed on different grounds. Most famously,
perhaps, Redhead and Teller have elaborated a methodological argument to
the effect that the Received View meshes better with the metaphysics of
Quantum Field Theory where - it is claimed - individuality is not assumed
from the word go (this argument goes back to Post 1963). This last claim
has been disputed (by de Muynck 1975 and van Fraasssen 1991; for criticisms
of the latter, see Butterfield 1993) and Balousek has insisted that to appeal
to methodology to break the underdetermination is to accede to a form of
conventionalism (Balousek 2000; for a response see Teller and Redhead 2001).
We shall not pursue the ins and outs of this debate here. The alternative
is to accept the underdetermination and explore its implications. As far as
the particles themselves are concerned, it motivates a shift - some might say
retreat - to a structuralist view of entities which eschews talk of individuality
or non-individuality entirely (see Ladyman 1998). According to such a view,
the particles are nothing but ‘nodes’ or ‘intersections’ in some kind of physical
structure, which now bears all the ontological weight. We shall consider how
PI looks from such a position shortly.
9. The Experimental and Theoretical Status of PI.
Returning to the issue of the status of PI, let us consider whether there
could there be direct evidence for the principle. We can examine this ques-
tion in a broader context: what is required for any symmetry principle to
be observable? Kosso has argued that the distinction between observable
and unobservable symmetries matches that between global and local. Thus
Lorentz invariance, for example, is directly observable whereas general co-
variance is not, since a specific dynamical principle such as the principle of
equivalence must be assumed in order to infer the symmetry from the ob-
servation (Kosso 2000). Now, a problem arises when it comes to symmetries
such as PI: in order to observe whether a symmetry holds or not, one must
be able to observe that a) the specified transformation has taken place; and
b) that the specified invariant property remains the same under the trans-
formation (ibid., 86). The first condition requires there to be a fixed point of
reference with respect to which the transformation can be measured. In the
case of the permutation of protons and neutrons underlying isospin symme-
try, for example, there exists a ‘fixed standard’ of what it is to be a neutron
and what it is to be a proton with respect to which the permutation makes
sense (ibid.). If, however, the symmetry is ‘observationally complete’, in the
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sense that all of the observable properties of the system are invariant un-
der the transformation, then the symmetry will be unobservable in principle
(ibid., 88). Kosso does not consider PI in his discussion but it is observa-
tionally complete in precisely this sense: in order to test whether it holds
or not, one would have to be able to experimentally distinguish the states
represented by| Ψ〉 and Pˆ | Ψ〉 to begin with. However, that is precisely what
the principle itself denies (Balousek 1999, 20).
If there can be no direct evidence for PI, is it demanded by the theory of
quantum mechanics itself? It is often claimed that PI is not logically required
by the axioms of the theory (Balousek ibid., 20), but of course, this depends
on what the latter are taken to include. Adopting a crude historical perspec-
tive, the work of Weyl, Dirac and von Neumann can be seen as an attempt
to impose order upon what was, in the late 1920s, a bit of a hodgepodge of
laws and principles, some of them ‘phenomenological’ in nature, such as the
Exclusion Principle. Weyl’s framework was explicitly group-theoretical and
here, as we have indicated, PI can be incorporated within this framework
as an expression of the metaphysical nature of quantum objects. Dirac, on
the other hand, eschewed both group theory and metaphysics, preferring his
own ‘bra’ and ‘ket’ framework in which PI is seen as nothing more than an
expression of the observational indistinguishability of | Ψ〉 and Pˆ | Ψ〉, from
a rather crude verificationist perspective. In the context of von Neumann’s
Hilbert space formalism PI does appear to be an extra postulate reflecting
either the metaphysical nature of quantum particles or some kind of ‘initial
condition’ as we noted above but of course one could make the case that it
should be added to the standard axioms of QM whatever they are in order
to extend the theory to give a quantum statistics. Whatever framework one
chooses, claims that PI is, in some sense, ‘ad hoc’ must be treated with cau-
tion. Where does all this leave the status of PI? It appears to be a kind
of ‘free-floating’ principle, one that is required neither experimentally nor
metaphysically. Huggett has proposed that it be regarded straightforwardly
as a symmetry on a par with rotational symmetry, for example (Huggett
1999). Now, of course, as Huggett acknowledges, the two symmetries are
very different25, but, nevertheless, PI is implied by the conjunction of a fur-
ther symmetry principle which space-time symmetries also obey together
25A quantum system of the kind we have been considering is not just covariant with
respect to permutations but invariant : permutations are not just indistinguishable to
appropriately transformed observers but to all observers.
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with the formal structure of the permutation group. This further principle is
what he calls ‘global Hamiltonian symmetry’ which implies that the relevant
symmetry operator commutes with the relevant Hamiltonian26. With regard
to the permutation group, of course, permutations of a sub-system are per-
mutations of the whole system and this ‘global Hamiltonian symmetry’ very
straightforwardly implies PI, without any additional assumptions concerning
the structure of state space (ibid., 344-345).27 Hence, Huggett concludes,
... we should view permutations in a similar light to rotations:
we should not take [permutation invariance] as a fundamental
symmetry principle in order to explain quantum statistics. In-
stead we should recognize that it is a particular consequence of
global Hamiltonian symmetry given the group structure of the
permutations. Further, if we accept the similarity of permuta-
tion and rotation symmetry, it becomes natural to see quantum
statistics as a natural result of the role symmetries play in nature.
(ibid., 346).
However, as Huggett acknowledges, permutation invariance only follows
from his general symmetry principle given the particular structure of the
permutation group. So the issue of the status of PI is pushed back a step:
what is the status of the structure of the permutation group? Or, to put
it another way, why should that particular group structure be applicable?
At one extreme we have the view that it is a priori. As is well known,
Weyl insisted that “all a priori statements in physics have their origin in
symmetry” (1952, 126). Not surprisingly, empiricists such as van Fraassen
have tended to resist this line (van Fraassen 1989) and move to the other
end of the spectrum, offering a broadly pragmatic answer to our question.
From this perspective, PI comes to be seen as nothing more than a problem
26What we take the relevant Hamiltonian to cover is crucial here because, again as
Huggett acknowledges, the principle would appear to be violated in the case where, for
example, we have a noncentral potential term in the Hamiltonian of an atomic system,
but, he insists, the symmetry is restored if we consider the ‘full’ Hamiltonian of system
plus field, which does commute with the operators of the rotation group. As he points out
(ibid., 345), if observers are taken to be systems too, this symmetry principle is equivalent
to covariance for space-time symmetries.
27It does, however, assume that the system being measured and the measurement ap-
paratus are composed of the same indistinguishable particles, otherwise the Hamiltonian
will not remain unchanged. Thanks to Nick Huggett for pointing this out.
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solving device (see Bueno 2001). Occupying the middle ground we have the
following alternative answers to our question:
1. It is just a brute fact. We have already encountered this option in our
discussion of PI as an ‘initial condition’ imposed on the situation.
2. It is to be understood as reflecting the metaphysically peculiar nature
of the particles themselves. However, given that the particles can also
be described in a metaphysically straightforward way - as individuals
- this option is always going to require some further principle whose
status may be less well grounded than that of PI itself28.
3. It is to be understood as reflecting a structural aspect of the world.
From this perspective, that the permutation group is applicable is nei-
ther a simple ‘brute fact’ nor metaphysically derivative, in the sense of
mathematically representing the nature of the particles, but rather it
represents something profoundly structural about the world.
Huggett rejects the first two options but then leaves the metaphysical
status of PI hanging. We shall pursue the last option a little further in
another context, namely the connection between permutations of particles
and diffeomorphisms of space-time points.
10 Permutation Symmetry, Structuralism and Diffeomorphism
Invariance.
Structuralism has a long and interesting history which is intimately bound
up with developments in physics. Both General Relativity and Quantum
Mechanics had a profound impact on the work of early structuralists such as
Cassirer and Eddington (for discussion, see French 2001). Putting it crudely,
the central idea of this programme is to effectively deconstruct the ‘object of
knowledge’ - whether space-time or quantum particles - into a web of relations
bound together by symmetry principles represented group theoretically. If
we focus on the group-theoretic representation of invariant properties such
as mass and spin, what this ‘deconstruction’ yields are kinds of particles (see
Castellani 1993 and 1998). Similarly, PI can be seen as embodying a form
of structuralist representation of ‘broader’ kinds, namely bosons, fermions,
28This is, in essence, the heart of the dispute between Balousek and Redhead and Teller.
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parabosons, parafermions and so on. In other words, the status of PI, from
this perspective, is that of one of the fundamental symmetry principles which
effectively binds the ‘web of relations’ constituting the structure of the world
into these broad kinds.
10.1 Permutation Symmetry and Structural Realism.
It is this kind of structuralist deconstruction of objects which is incorpo-
rated into Ladyman’s ‘ontic’ form of structural realism, alluded to above. As
we indicated, this attempts to avoid the metaphysical underdetermination
that PI yields by reconceptualising quantum objects entirely in structural
terms (see French and Ladyman 2002 and Saunders 2002). However, the fol-
lowing objection has been raised to such a move: if structure is understood in
‘relational’ terms - as it typically is - then there need to be ‘relata’, and these
cannot be relational themselves. The force of the objection is clearly seen in
the case of PI: we began by considering the distribution of objects over states
and the effects of permutations on such objects. How can PI play a part in
the ‘deconstruction’ of objects into structures when its very articulation is
based on the assumption that there are objects to begin with? In responding
to this objection, structuralists typically appeal to the following manouevre
(it can be found in Eddington and, before him, Poincare´, for example): we
recall that we begin by introducing particle labels and it is upon these that
the particle permutation operator acts. We then assume that these labels
denote objects - an assumption that may be supported by the observation of
the individual flashes on a scintillation screen, for example - and this allows
us to apply the mathematics of group theory (with its underlying standard
set theory). However, once we have obtained the relevant structure, we can
dispense with our original assumption, regarding it as no more than a heuris-
tic crutch and the labels as simply convenient place holders which serve only
to help us focus attention on what is metaphysically fundamental - PI in
this case. To use a famous metaphor, the object is a kind of ‘ladder’ which
we use to reach the structure but which we can then ‘throw away’, or ‘de-
construct’. Of course, there are other objections to structural realism which
must be addressed (see, for example, Bueno op. cit., and Chakravartty 2001)
but our intention here is just to indicate what may be a natural home for
the structuralist understanding of PI. Furthermore, this sort of picture can
accommodate a structuralist conception of space-time as well.
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10.2 Diffeomorphisms, Permutations, and the Structuralist
Conception of Space-Time.
Stachel (2002) has recently explored the connections between the inter-
pretation of general covariance and permutation invariance on the one hand
and the metaphysical analyses of space-time points and quantum particles on
the other. He begins by abstracting the differentiability and continuity prop-
erties of manifolds leaving a bare set of points. The (continuous) principle of
diffeomorphism invariance then becomes (discrete) permutation invariance.
A version of the hole argument can then be seen to apply to this set (see
Norton 1988 for an elementary account of this argument). We have already
seen how such a set, along with PI, models the statistical behaviour of ensem-
bles of indistinguishable quantum particles. Thus the analogy is complete
and extends, mutatis mutandis, to any theory which “demands the complete
indistinguishability of its fundamental objects” (ibid., 18).
On this basis the choice between ‘substantivalist’ and ‘relationist’ con-
ceptions of space-time is rendered as that between the ‘individual’ and ‘non-
individual’ metaphysics of points. Stachel himself opts for the latter package
(applying the result to both the space-time and particle cases). The ‘reduced
phase space’ method of solving the hole argument29 is then understood as
applying to the permutation case (where the gauge orbits are equivalence
classes of permuted states). Since that solution is seen by Stachel as corre-
sponding to a relational solution, the particle case is understood similarly.
The idea is that the objects in a set (be they the points of a manifold or the
members of a quantum ensemble) are individuated only by the relations of
that set: indistinguishable objects are not individuals intrinsically but de-
rive that property from relations. We have been here before, of course, with
Saunders’ Quinean approach to PII above and, indeed, Saunders also applies
this approach to the space-time case.
The central idea here, then, is that any theory that demands the complete
indistinguishability of its fundamental objects requires invariance under the
full permutation group for discrete symmetries or the diffeomorphism group
for continuous symmetries. Stachel explicitly draws the analogy between sub-
stantivalism in the space-time case and assuming individuality for quantum
particles, and relationism and non-individuality, respectively. Moving in the
other direction both Maidens (1993) and Hoefer (1996) have explored the idea
29This solution takes the equivalence classes of diffeomorphic states (i.e., the gauge
orbits) as the points of a new ‘reduced’ or ‘physical’ phase space.
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of regarding space-time points as ‘non-individuals’ in some sense (Saunders
op. cit. endorses Hoefer’s conclusions). What then becomes crucial is the
sense in which the points are regarded as non-individuals, just as we have dis-
cussed for particles. Stachel, in particular, understands the non-individuality
of particles as their being individuated “entirely in terms of the relational
structures in which they are embedded” (hence the analogy with relationism
on the space-time side). But then it is not clear what metaphysical work the
notion of ‘non-individuality’ is doing, when we still have ‘objects’ which are
represented by standard set theory (and this is precisely the criticism that
can be levelled against attempts to import non-individuality into the space-
time context). What one needs to do to flesh out such an account is to apply
to space-time points the kind of ‘quasi-set’ theory that has been applied to
non-individual quantum particles (Krause 1992). Of course, Stachel could
still maintain individuality in both cases but at the price of introducing inac-
cessible states in quantum mechanics and indeterminism in spacetime theory.
In both cases we seem to have a kind of metaphysical underdetermination.
Again the alternative, ‘middle way’, is to drop objects out of the ontology
entirely, regarding both space-time and particles in structural terms. Indeed,
this appears to be the more appropriate way of understanding both Stachel’s
talk of individuating objects “entirely in terms of the relational structures
in which they are embedded” (ibid., 2) and, as we have seen, Saunders’ ac-
count of “weakly discernible” entities. However, rather than thinking of the
objects being individuated, we suggest they should be thought of as being
structurally constituted in the first place. In other words, it is the relational
structures which are regarded as metaphysically primary and the objects as
secondary or ‘emergent’. The labels that appear in both cases, assigned to
space-time points and particles respectively, are just mathematical devices
which allow us to apply our set-theoretical resources. And in both cases, the
relevant symmetries, encoded in diffeomorphism invariance and PI, respec-
tively, will be seen as essential components of this structural metaphysics.
There is, for sure, plenty of work to be done here; but this structural
perspective places symmetry at the heart of our metaphysics, and that surely
makes the task a tantalising one!
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